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Cross-Border Transfers of Court 
Proceedings
VAUGHAN BLACK*
To thee I have transferred / All judgment
Paradise Lost, Book X, 56-57
THE COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS TRANSFER ACT1 might easily have 
been two statutes rather than one. There could have been a pair of uniform 
acts, one delineating the territorial competence of the provinces’ superior courts 
and the other implementing a regime for the cross-border transfer of court 
proceedings. After all, these two matters are neither logically interdependent 
nor especially tightly linked. Part 3 of the CJPTA, dealing with transfers of 
proceedings,2 is not confined to lawsuits where the initial court takes jurisdiction 
* Schulich School of Law, Halifax. Thanks to Stephen Pitel, John MacCormick, the 
participants in the 2016 Toronto symposium on the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings 
Transfer Act, and two external examiners for comments on drafts.
1. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting, 1994, 
Appendix C: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, online: <www.ulcc.ca/images/
stories/1994_EN_pdf/1994ulcc0008_Court_Jurisdiction_Proceedings_Transfer_Act.pdf> at 
140 [CJPTA]. The CJPTA has been brought into force in three provinces: Saskatchewan (see 
The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C-41.1); British Columbia (see 
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c 28); and Nova Scotia (see Court 
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003, (2nd Sess), c 2). 
2. The Uniform CJPTA and the Saskatchewan and British Columbia versions are divided 
into three numbered parts, the first of which is headed “Interpretation.” Unhelpfully, Nova 
Scotia’s CJPTA does not assign a number to the opening interpretation part, so it is out of 
step with the other three. I go with the majority, so throughout this paper “Part 2” refers to 
the CJPTA’s sections addressing territorial competence and “Part 3” denotes those dealing 
with transfers of proceedings.
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under Part 2. It applies regardless of whether the initial court bases its jurisdiction 
on the CJPTA or on some other legislation, such as a specialized family law 
statute. Indeed, it applies when the transferring court does not have territorial 
competence at all. While the matters dealt with, respectively, in Parts 2 and 3 of 
the CJPTA certainly fall within the broad domain of private international law, 
they are no more closely affiliated than other fields where the CJPTA’s progenitor, 
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (“ULCC”), elected to deal with matters 
in discrete statutes. For example, the ULCC chose to address cross-border 
enforcement by drafting separate uniform acts dealing with recognition of (1) 
Canadian civil judgments, (2) foreign-country civil judgments, (3) international 
arbitral awards, (4) foreign subpoenas, (5) foreign maintenance and custody 
orders, (6) foreign child welfare orders, and (7) foreign judgments based on a 
contract containing an exclusive forum-selection clause.3 In short, the ULCC 
has not been in the habit of drafting sweeping, comprehensive uniform acts but 
rather has elected to advance in increments. It has been a splitter, not a lumper.
No doubt there are solid reasons for this piecemeal and gradual approach to 
uniform legislation. For one thing, a uniform act dealing with a wide range of 
matters and offered to the provinces on an all-or-nothing basis might be enacted 
by none. A fragmentary method seems better geared to increasing the likelihood 
of provincial adoption. Whatever the explanation for this piecemeal approach, 
when it came to the CJPTA, the ULCC did not adhere to it. It opted instead to 
weld together two distinct matters.4 There is nothing disastrous about this. It does 
mean, however, that generalizations about one of the CJPTA’s two main parts may 
3. Respectively these are the following: (1) Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform 
Enforcement of Canadian Judgements and Decrees Act (Whitehorse: Uniform Law Conference 
of Canada, 1997); (2) Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgements Act (Fredericton: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 2003); (3) Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada, Uniform International Commercial Arbitration Act (Victoria: Uniform 
Law Conference of Canada, 1987); (4) Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform 
Interjurisdictional Subpoenas Act (Whitehorse: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 2012); 
(5) Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Maintenance and Custody Enforcement Act (Uniform 
Law Conference of Canada); (6) Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Inter-Jurisdiction 
Child Welfare Orders Act (Yellowknife: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 1989); and (7) 
Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Choice of Court Agreements Convention Act 
(Québec City: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 2008). All can be found on the Uniform 
Acts section of the ULCC’s website (see Uniform Law Conference of Canada, “Uniform Acts 
Information,” online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-new-order>). 
4. For argument on why the CJPTA should be split into two statutes, see Stephen Pitel & 
Vaughan Black, “Time for New Tools to Manage Interprovincial Commercial Litigation,” 
The Lawyer’s Daily (1 November 2017), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/4970/
time-for-new-tools-to-manage-interprovincial-commercial-litigation>.
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have little applicability to the other. Moreover, when one of the two conjoined 
parts thrives and the other does not, as has been the case with the CJPTA, we may 
tend to overlook the latter’s existence and speak as if the CJPTA was no more than 
its provisions dealing with territorial competence and forum non conveniens. The 
Supreme Court of Canada was guilty of this in Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda when 
it described the CJPTA as “a uniform Act to govern issues related to jurisdiction 
and to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”5 In the same vein, in Teck Cominco 
Metals Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriters6 the Supreme Court stated that the purpose 
of the CJPTA was to bring Canadian law into conformity with Morguard7 and 
Amchem.8 These three statements make sense as a description of Part 2 of the 
CJPTA. However, they have no bearing on Part 3. The symposium at which 
this article was originally presented adopts a similar perspective. Its subtitle— 
“A Decade of Progress”—seems more focused on Part 2 of the CJPTA than Part 
3, where not a lot has happened. Reflecting this, many of the symposium papers 
considered the former, and only this paper analyzed the latter.
All this is understandable. While Part 3 of the CJPTA—the transfer part—is 
longer than Part 2, with more sections and more words, it has generated much 
less judicial activity, and none at the Supreme Court of Canada. There are 
some plausible explanations for this. Part 3 is confusing reading. Its ungainly 
provisions deal with both the power of the superior courts9 of a CJPTA province 
to initiate a transfer, and with that of the second court to accept and conclude 
one, while shifting back and forth between the two. Moreover, unlike the part 
dealing with territorial competence, which simply reconfigures familiar territory, 
Part 3 of the CJPTA enacts something new. There are no precedents in Canada 
or elsewhere for a comprehensive regime for cross-border transfers of judicial 
5. Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 at para 40, [2012] 1 SCR 572.
6. 2009 SCC 11 at para 22, [2009] 1 SCR 321. This passage was cited with approval in 
Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP v Cassells Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016 SCC 30 
at para 113, [2016] 1 SCR 851.
7. Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077, 76 DLR (4th) 256.
8. Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1993] 1 SCR 897, 
102 DLR (4th) 96.
9. But not appellate courts. In Liu v Composites Atlantic Ltd, a party who had not requested a 
transfer before the trial court asked the appeal court to initiate one. The Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal rightly observed that the “power to transfer a proceeding is given to the Supreme 
Court of Nova Scotia, not to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.” See Liu v Composites Atlantic 
Ltd, 2013 NSCA 142 at para 15, 339 NSR (2d) 30. 
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proceedings.10 Among the novel questions arising from cross-border transfers of 
court proceedings are: which jurisdiction’s limitation period governs a transferred 
proceeding, what happens to a pre-trial motion that is incomplete at the time 
a transfer is made, what happens if the initial court makes a transfer request 
and then changes its mind about the terms of that request, and what happens 
if a transfer is made contingent on the transferee court complying with certain 
terms or conditions and those conditions later become impractical.11 These, and 
a number of other details, are dealt with in Part 3. They are somewhat clarified in 
the ULCC’s commentary on the CJPTA12 and more fully explored in the relevant 
chapter of the one book devoted to the statute, Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis 
of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act.13 Nevertheless, much about 
10. There are, however, some precedents that apply in limited circumstances. See e.g., Divorce 
Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 6. This section applies in child custody matters in divorce 
petitions. For other instances of provisions permitting some version of a cross-border transfer 
of judicial proceedings, see Vaughan Black, Stephen GA Pitel & Michael Sobkin, Statutory 
Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2012) at 215-21. 
11. This last matter is dealt with in the CJPTA. See CJPTA, supra note 1, s 22. Section 15(2) 
allows a court issuing a transfer request to impose conditions precedent and also dictate 
terms concerning the further conduct of the proceedings (ibid). There is some dispute as 
to whether those terms and conditions may only be imposed on the parties or may, in the 
alternative or in addition, be dictated directly to the receiving court. See e.g. Gillis v BCE Inc, 
2014 NSSC 279, 348 NSR (2d) 276. In this case the court was asked to impose conditions 
directly on the transferee court. Although it elected not to issue a transfer request at all, the 
court expressed no concern with the notion of such a condition. See also Cresswell v Cresswell 
Estate, 2017 BCSC 1183, 281 ACWS (3d) 522. In Cresswell, the BC Supreme Court took 
the view that, while terms and conditions might be imposed on the parties, it would be 
“presumptuous and inappropriate” to impose conditions on the receiving court’s conduct of 
the hearing (ibid at para 5). While imposing or attempting to impose conditions directly on 
a foreign court would indeed be presumptuous in the context of a forum non conveniens stay, 
where the foreign action rests on its own bottom, it is less clear that it should be regarded as 
such in the transfer context. In the latter case, the initial court is merely making a request 
that the foreign court accept a transfer of the proceeding, a request that the foreign court is at 
liberty to decline. In that context, including a condition—even one that binds the receiving 
court—is not necessarily presumptuous. This is particularly so when it is recalled that a 
transfer request might be made at any point in the proceeding. While most will be made 
early on, the CJPTA does not preclude transfers being made later in a proceeding. In such 
circumstances the initial court might well want to impose conditions requiring a receiving 
court, if it should accept the transfer, to respect and abide by certain rulings the initial court 
had made before the transfer.
12. The commentary was published along with the CJPTA, supra note 1.
13. Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 10, ch 9. This chapter also explores whether the 
proceedings transfer provisions of the CJPTA might in part be constitutionally infirm, 
an important question but one not pursued here.
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the novel field of proceedings transfers remains terra incognita. It is unsurprising 
that lawyers have been cautious in exploring it.
 There is little that is new in the area in the four years since Statutory 
Jurisdiction appeared. Rather than repeat its contents here, this paper explores the 
state of Part 3 of the CJPTA through a close examination of a single case: Hudye 
Farms Inc v Canadian Wheat Board.14 This dispute, which resulted in decisions by 
both the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench and the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal, is the closest thing we have to a leading case on the CJPTA’s proceedings 
transfer provisions. In her unanimous judgment in Hudye CA, Justice Jackson 
set forth a step-by-step template or schema for how transfer applications should 
be assessed. Her reasons, and in particular that template, have been quoted and 
cited with approval both by subsequent Saskatchewan decisions (including one 
by the Court of Appeal)15 and by two rulings of the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal.16 The first instance and appeal judgments in Hudye encapsulate 
and exemplify much of what is commendable and encouraging in the CJPTA 
proceedings transfer decisions to date, including a willingness to be adventurous 
and initiate a transfer from a CJPTA province to a non-CJPTA one.17 At the same 
14. Hudye Farms Inc v Canadian Wheat Board, 2011 SKQB 29, 368 Sask R 157 [Hudye QB],  
Hudye Farms Inc v Canadian Wheat Board, 2011 SKCA 137, 342 DLR (4th) 659  
[Hudye CA].
15. See Microcell Communications Inc v Frey, 2011 SKCA 136 at para 112, 342 DLR (4th) 
513. Hudye CA was quoted in multiple Court of Queen’s Bench cases. See e.g. Ping Leung 
v Apk Holdings Ltd, 2013 SKQB 382 at para 11, 431 Sask R 291; Yara Belle Plaine Inc v 
Ingersoll-Rand Company, 2014 SKQB 254 at para 28, [2014] 11 WWR 140; Babey v Greer, 
2015 SKQB 219 at para 26, 473 Sask R 119, rev’d 2016 SKCA 45, 396 DLR (4th) 394; 
Cupola Investments Inc v Remai, 2016 SKQB 359 at paras 17-18, 273 ACWS (3d) 519.
16. Preymann v Ayus Technology Corp, 2012 BCCA 30 at paras 34, 41-44, 32 BCLR (5th) 391 
[Preymann]; Douez v Facebook, Inc, 2014 BCSC 953 at para 31, 242 ACWS (3d) 774, rev’d 
2015 BCCA 279, 77 BCLR (5th) 116. Hudye CA was also approved by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Douez v Facebook, Inc, 2017 SCC 33 at para 21, 97 BCLR (5th) 1 [Douez 
SCC]. However, the Court did not single out the scheme in question. Preymann and Hudye 
CA were cited and quoted on this point in Winvan Paving Ltd v Gencor Industries, Inc, 2015 
BCSC 233 at para 28, 250 ACWS (3d) 246.
17. The Saskatchewan courts had first embraced this in Walling v Walling, 2007 SKQB 43, 
294 Sask R 256, where the judge was prepared to consider a transfer request to the courts 
of Alberta. In Tochor v Rudensky, 2016 SKQB 52, 264 ACWS (3d) 635, the court thought 
that it had the power to request a transfer to Ontario but ultimately did not do so since it 
thought Saskatchewan was the forum conveniens. Likewise the courts of British Columbia and 
Nova Scotia have been prepared, under the CJPTA, to consider and sometimes make transfer 
requests to the courts of non-CJPTA provinces. See e.g. Knapp Consulting Inc v Continovation 
Services Inc, 2012 BCSC 887, 216 ACWS (3d) 630; Wilson v Wilson, 2013 NSSC 427, 
341 NSR (2d) 86.
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time, both decisions illustrate some of the chronic shortcomings in the case law 
on that subject. And finally, as we shall see, what happened in that case after the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal granted the application for a transfer request also 
tells us something about the state of the law regarding proceedings transfers.
The dispute arose out of a contract that had an exclusive forum-selection clause 
in favour of Manitoba. When the plaintiffs sued in Saskatchewan, the defendant 
Wheat Board brought an application to give effect to the choice-of-forum 
clause. First, it asked the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench to hold that it 
lacked territorial competence over the proceeding. Second, the defendant argued 
that if the court should conclude that it had territorial competence, it should 
decline to exercise it. Third, the Wheat Board asked for an order transferring the 
proceeding to Manitoba. At first instance, Justice Sandomirsky concluded that he 
had territorial competence, declined to exercise it in light of the forum-selection 
clause, and concluded as follows: “A transfer of these proceedings to the Court of 
Queen’s Bench of Manitoba pursuant to s. [13](1)(a) of the CJPTA is warranted 
and I so order.”18
The holding on territorial competence was not appealed, but the other two 
were. In upholding the decision to decline jurisdiction and initiate a transfer 
to Manitoba, Justice Jackson first noted that the Supreme Court of Canada 
had endorsed the efficacy of forum-selection clauses in ZI Pompey Industrie v 
ECU-Line NV,19 a non-CJPTA case. She then laid out a step-by-step template for 
how a court should go about deciding a CJPTA case where a defendant took issue 
with a plaintiff’s decision to bring an action in the non-chosen court contrary to 
a forum-selection clause:
18. Hudye QB, supra note 14 at para 44. An explanation is needed for the square brackets in 
the quoted passage. The court’s original language referred not to s 13(1)(a) but to s 12(1)
(a). Saskatchewan’s CJPTA’s section numbers differ from those in the uniform and British 
Columbia CJPTAs because, mistakenly, Saskatchewan did not adopt s 6, the forum of 
necessity provision (see Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 10 at 36). Jumping back and 
forth between the Saskatchewan section numbers and those in the uniform CJPTA would 
be confusing, so I have used the numbering of the uniform CJPTA throughout, even when 
referring to the Saskatchewan Act. That is, to reduce confusion I have altered the quotations 
from Hudye QB to reflect the numbering in the uniform CJPTA. 
 Note that the result in this case permitted the forum-selection clause to affect not only 
the parties to the contract in which it was contained but also the two plaintiffs who were 
not parties to that contract. For a discussion of this matter, see Vaughan Black & Stephen 
GA Pitel, “Forum-Selection Clauses: Beyond the Contracting Parties” (2016) 12:1 J 
Private Int’l L 26.
19. 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1 SCR 450 [Pompey].
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When a defendant applies pursuant to the CJPTA for an order that the 
Court decline competence over an action, the framework for analysis takes 
this general form:
1. Does the Province have territorial competence over the matter? If no, 
the action cannot continue. It may be appropriate in a given case to 
bypass this issue and proceed to the next step.
2. If the Province has territorial competence or assuming territorial 
competence, has the defendant/applicant established that the forum 
selection clause is valid, clear and enforceable and that it applies to a 
cause of action before the Court? If no, the application fails. 
3. If the forum selection clause is valid, clear and enforceable, and it applies 
to a cause of action before the Court, has the plaintiff/respondent 
shown strong cause why the Court should not give effect to the forum 
selection clause?
4. If the plaintiff/respondent has not shown strong cause why the Court 
should not give effect to the forum selection clause, the Court should 
consider, according to the application before it, whether it is appropriate 
to transfer the proceeding to some other territory pursuant to Part 
III of the CJPTA.20
While there is nothing especially startling in this schema, it is nevertheless 
worth considering in some detail. A step-by-step examination of the Hudye CA 
framework does not raise all the important issues under Part 3 of the CJPTA, 
but it does consider many of them. In addition, looking at how the template was 
applied in that case and what happened next raises other points of interest.
The first of these arises from the opening step in Justice Jackson’s four-stage 
framework—a step that is potentially misleading. Hudye CA’s template says 
that a court should first determine whether it has territorial competence over 
the matters. So far so good. But then it adds that if the court concludes that it 
20. Hudye CA, supra note 14 para 12. Although the quoted template deals with the situation 
where a defendant applies for an order that the initial court decline competence, it is worth 
noting that the option of a transfer request opens up the possibility that a plaintiff might 
make such an application. A plaintiff who wanted to sue in province A but was faced with 
the fact that province A lacked territorial competence might start a suit in province B, 
a CJPTA province that had territorial competence, and then immediately follow up with an 
application to the court in province B asking that it decline competence and issue a transfer 
request to the courts of province A. Such a request is possible under section 14(1) of the 
CJPTA, in that if the initial court has both territorial and subject-matter competence it may 
issue a transfer request to a court in the province which lacks the former, so long as that 
requested court (1) has subject-matter competence and (2) is a more appropriate forum.
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lacks territorial competence, “the action cannot continue.”21 The framework does 
not say more about what might be done if the initial court finds that it lacks 
territorial competence, implying that the only option in the event of a finding of 
lack of territorial competence is a dismissal.22 
Yet a dismissal is not the only option. Contrary to what Hudye CA’s 
framework suggests, Part 3 of the CJPTA provides that when the initial court 
concludes that it lacks jurisdiction, the action can still continue. That is one 
of Part 3’s chief innovations. Of course, the action cannot continue in the 
original court—that is axiomatic. But, Part 3 sets out a process whereby the 
proceeding might continue elsewhere. Part 3 contains a provision authorizing 
courts which find that they lack territorial competence to make a transfer request 
to another court that has the requisite jurisdiction. That is, in Hudye QB, even 
if the trial judge had agreed with the defendant’s initial claim that the courts of 
Saskatchewan lacked territorial competence, the CJPTA empowered him to make 
a transfer request, provided certain criteria were met (namely, that the initial 
court arrives at a determination that the requested court possesses both territorial 
and subject-matter jurisdiction).23
It might seem picayune to take the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to task on 
this point, since it was dealing with a case where the lower court had determined 
it had territorial competence, a finding that was not challenged on appeal. Yet, 
Hudye CA was purporting to lay down a general framework and other parts of its 
template spell out options the court did not pursue in the case before it. It is not 
unreasonable to expect completeness and exactitude in the framing of that 
template; the court should not have implied that a finding of lack of territorial 
competence was the end of the line. Moreover, a transfer even in the face of 
a lack of territorial competence might easily have arisen in Hudye QB. Recall 
that at first instance the defendant Wheat Board asked for (1) a finding of no 
territorial competence, (2) in the alternative, if competence existed, an exercise of 
the court’s discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction, and (3) a transfer request. 
The third item—the transfer request—was not something the defendant asked 
for only in the event that the court should conclude that it had jurisdiction but 
would decline to exercise it. Rather, the defendant apparently wanted the transfer 
21. Hudye CA, supra note 14 at para 12.
22. This reading is further justified by the remainder of the framework, which implies that the 
only way a court can get to a transfer request is if it determines it should discretionarily 
decline to exercise its territorial competence. In connection to this, the final sentence of 
paragraph 1 of the Hudye CA framework is also open to objection. See Hudye CA, supra 
note 14 at para 1.
23. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 14(2).
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request to be issued even if the court concluded it lacked territorial competence. 
That being the case, for Hudye CA to set out a schema suggesting that a finding of 
no competence would necessarily put an end to the matter was unhelpful.
This leads to a further point, one arising from a lacuna in the template. 
In Hudye QB, there was never any express finding that the court to which the 
transfer request was directed had subject-matter competence in the proceeding. 
The same goes for Hudye CA. The matter was never put in issue, so perhaps 
the silence is understandable. Nevertheless, section 14(1) of the CJPTA, which 
deals with the type of transfer request in that case (the type where the initial 
court concludes it has territorial competence but that another court is more 
appropriate), sets out two preconditions that must be satisfied before such a 
request can be issued. The first precondition is that the receiving court is the 
more appropriate forum for the proceeding. Both the Hudye QB and Hudye 
CA judgments spent a lot of time on this issue. The second precondition is that 
the receiving court has subject-matter competence in the proceeding. Neither 
court addressed this. Perhaps more crucially, the Hudye CA template makes no 
mention of it.24 It would have been helpful for it to do so.
The problem might not have arisen had the courts in both Hudye QB and 
Hudye CA been more specific about which of the CJPTA’s two transfer request 
provisions they were relying on. Recall that in Hudye QB, Justice Sandomirsky 
had concluded: “A transfer of these proceedings to the Court of Queen’s Bench of 
Manitoba pursuant to s. [13](1)(a) of the CJPTA is warranted and I so order.”25 
A reference to a specific section of the CJPTA is welcome; sometimes transfer 
requests are initiated but no section of Part 3 of the CJPTA is referenced in the 
court’s reasons.26 This can prove problematic as there is more than one section 
empowering transfer requests and it can be important to know which section is 
being invoked. The difficulty with Hudye QB’s mention of section 13 is that it 
is the incorrect—or at least not the ideal—section. The court refers to section 
13(1)(a) but nothing in section 13 authorizes a court to make a transfer. Rather, 
section 13, which is headed “General provisions related to transfers,” is just a 
preambular, introductory section. It is the opening section in Part 3 of the CJPTA 
and does little more than to provide an overview for the specific, empowering 
24. Note that the requirement that one court determine whether a foreign court has 
subject-matter competence over a proceeding raises a choice of law question: which law the 
former court should apply in making this determination. See ibid, s 14(3) (specifying that 
the law of the prospective transferee state must be applied). 
25. Hudye QB, supra note 14 at para 44.
26. See e.g. O’Connor v Chapman, 2007 BCSC 657, 173 ACWS (3d) 800; Broman v Machida 
Mack Shewchuk Meagher LLP, 2010 BCSC 760, 189 ACWS (3d) 702.
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sections that follow. My point here may appear pedantic, but I hope it is not 
entirely so. Transfer requests can be of different sorts. Transfers under section 
14(1) have different preconditions and consequences than those under section 
14(2), and courts should be clear about which sort of transfer they are initiating. 
In the type of transfer at issue in Hudye QB, where the initial court has both 
territorial and subject-matter competence, that court cannot request a transfer 
unless the court to which it contemplates issuing a request has subject-matter 
competence in the proceeding, even where it determines that the other court 
would be the more appropriate forum for the proceeding.27 Moreover, the initial 
court’s determination of whether the potential requested court would have 
subject-matter competence must be made according to the law of that potential 
requested court.28 So Hudye QB’s reference to section 13, adopted by Hudye CA, 
is less helpful than a reference to the specific empowering section would have been.
Moving on with the Hudye CA template, steps 2 and 3 generate a further 
comment—one that applies to forum non conveniens applications regardless of 
whether they are accompanied by transfer requests. That grows out of the difficulty 
27. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 14(1)(a). For an example of a decision which does a better job in this 
regard, see Wheatland Industrial Park Inc (Re), 2013 BCSC 27 at paras 39-40, 42 BCLR 
(5th) 177 [Wheatland]. In Wheatland, the court identifies the subsection of the CJPTA 
under which it is purporting to issue a transfer request (and moreover specifies that it is 
making a request, not ordering a transfer) and goes on to make express findings that the 
relevant preconditions are satisfied. The decision is interesting in that it involves a section 
13(2) transfer—that is, one where the initial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. The 
court finds this condition to be fulfilled due to the remedy requested by the petitioners. 
The dispute involved land in Alberta and the limitation arising from British South Africa 
Co v Companhia de Moçambique, [1893] AC 602 (HL), [1891-94] 4 All ER Rep 640 
[Moçambique]. Had the petitioners requested a different remedy, the court might have been 
able to invoke the exception that permits judges to issue in personam orders affecting foreign 
land found in cases such as Minera Aquiline Argentina SA v IMA Exploration Inc, 2006 
BCSC 1102, 58 BCLR (4th) 217, aff’d 2007 BCCA 319, 68 BCLR (4th) 242 (which the 
court in Wheatland referred to at para 21). However, the remedy requested by the plaintiff 
in this instance did not fall within that exception. Wheatland thus appears to stand for the 
proposition that the question of whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim 
(at least for the purposes of the transfer provisions of the CJPTA) may depend on the remedy 
a plaintiff requests. The distinction is a key one. As with a number of (perhaps most) cases 
in which a court issues a transfer request, the transfer in this case never happened. Following 
the decision in favour of a transfer request, the plaintiffs started another action in British 
Columbia claiming a remedy (damages) that did not run afoul of the Moçambique rule 
and the defendants did not pursue the transfer request. Email from Kevin Loo, Counsel 
for respondent joint ventures in Wheatland, to Vaughan Black (15 September 2016) 
[unpublished, on file with author]. 
28. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 14(3).
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resulting from the fact that the CJPTA’s forum non conveniens considerations, 
though expansive, make no mention of how to evaluate applications to exercise 
judicial discretion and decline to hear a matter allegedly brought in breach of a 
forum-selection clause in favour of a foreign court. The text of the CJPTA appears 
to subordinate all forum non conveniens applications to the “most appropriate 
forum” question, without mention of the fact that the parties might have dealt 
with the matter contractually. This statutory language might be read as standing 
in opposition to the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding that such clauses should 
almost always be given effect.29 This is a recurring problem.30 
In Hudye QB, Justice Sandomirsky had proceeded on the basis that the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Pompey meant that, in the absence of 
strong cause for overriding the forum selection clause, he did not have to consult 
the CJPTA’s list of discretionary factors for declining jurisdiction.31 Hudye CA 
imposed a different, and preferable, approach. It held that consideration of a 
forum-selection clause (and Pompey’s strong cause test for the enforceability 
of such a clause) falls within the CJPTA’s listed forum non conveniens factors.32 
Its template then separates and orders the steps a court should take in deciding 
whether to decline jurisdiction due to a forum selection clause exclusively 
designating another forum: the court should first determine that the clause is 
valid, clear and enforceable; next, that the clause applies to the cause of action 
before the court; and finally, if the first two steps are satisfied, that the plaintiff 
has not demonstrated strong cause why the clause should not be enforced.33 This 
approach to reconciling the strong cause test with the CJPTA does less violence to 
the text of the CJPTA than the approach taken in Hudye QB, and the framework’s 
step-by-step parsing of the matter should be useful to lower courts.
The next point arises from step 4 of the Hudye CA framework, which specifies 
that when the strong cause test has not been met “the Court should consider, 
according to the application before it, whether it is appropriate to transfer the 
29. Pompey, supra note 19.
30. See Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 10 at 207-11; Stephen GA Pitel & Nicholas S Rafferty, 
Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) at 129-30; Douez SCC, supra note 16 
at paras 17-22.
31. Hudye QB, supra note 14 at para 45.
32. Hudye CA, supra note 14 at para 11.
33. Ibid at para 12. 
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proceeding … .”34 The court in Hudye QB proceeded by exercising its discretion 
twice: first to decide whether to decline to assert its territorial competence, and 
second, having held that it should not, to decide whether to issue a stay or initiate 
a transfer. That is, having first determined that it should decline to exercise its 
competence, the court thought it had to address which of two responses to take—
imposing a stay or a transfer.35 Such an approach—akin to first deciding the right, 
then selecting the best remedy—seems natural. Yet note that under the CJPTA 
both of those questions should be answered in light of the same considerations. 
The CJPTA provides that the decision whether to decline to exercise territorial 
competence must be made in light of a determination whether the local court 
or a foreign one is “a more appropriate forum to try the proceeding,” and it goes 
on to list some factors for making this determination.36 Similarly, the provision 
of the CJPTA dealing with transfer applications provides that that the question 
of whether a transfer should be ordered is to be decided by the same criterion: 
whether the receiving court “is a more appropriate forum for the proceeding.” 
The CJPTA requires this assessment to be made in light of the same list of factors 
employed in deciding whether to decline jurisdiction. This appears to necessitate 
that the court consider the same question twice. Can it do so and still, as Hudye 
QB implies, reach different results—that is, can the court hold that for the 
purposes of declining jurisdiction the foreign court is more appropriate, but that 
for the purposes of initiating a transfer it is not?
Hudye QB proceeded as though there was nothing problematic about 
this. Having decided that it should decline jurisdiction, the court then had to 
choose between a stay and a transfer. It noted that “as there is no proceeding 
pending in Manitoba over the same issues between these parties, striking out 
the Saskatchewan proceeding is not appropriate. A stay of the Saskatchewan 
proceedings is not economically or otherwise practical.” That is, it looked at 
matters that were not pertinent to the determination of the most appropriate 
forum but rather to the choice between a stay and a transfer. This is to treat 
section 14(1)(b) of the CJPTA as if it authorizes a transfer request based on 
“whether the receiving court is a more appropriate forum for the proceeding 
34. Ibid at paras 12, 14. A question arises whether the words “according to the application before 
it” imply that a court can only contemplate a transfer request if one of the parties requests it, 
and never proprio motu. The text of the CJPTA is not conclusive on this point. Despite the 
wording of step 4 of the Hudye CA framework, the answer, at least in Saskatchewan, seems to 
be that a court can act on its own motion. For an exploration of this matter, see Black, Pitel 
& Sobkin, supra note 10 at 223-24.
35. Hudye QB, supra note 14 at para 44.
36. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 11.
BLACK,  CROSS-BORDER TRANSFERS OF COURT PROCEEDINGS 251
and, all things considered, a transfer is a more appropriate response than a mere stay 
of proceedings.” The italicized words are, of course, not part of section 14(1)(b). 
It might have been better if they were, and Hudye QB operates as if they are.
Hudye CA’s four-step framework is less than clear on whether this is the 
right way to proceed. However, it does not preclude this method. Moreover, the 
court of appeal did not take issue with Hudye QB, so perhaps we may regard 
this approach as having appellate approval. The two-stage approach seems the 
clearly preferable one. Both the decision to decline jurisdiction and the decision 
whether to issue a transfer request are discretionary matters. Interpreting the 
CJPTA so that the transfer decision is made in two steps—first in light of the 
most appropriate forum test, and next in light of the relative merits of a stay 
vis-à-vis a transfer37—may not be perfectly faithful to the wording of the CJPTA, 
but does little violence to it, and its “right then remedy” methodology allows a 
more nuanced assessment of the considerations at stake. 
Having set out its template, Hudye CA then applied it. Justice Jackson 
concluded that she saw “no basis to set aside Sandomirsky J.’s decision to decline 
territorial competence, in relation to the whole of the action, and to transfer 
the proceedings to Manitoba.”38 It will be recalled that Justice Sandomirsky had 
concluded that he should order a transfer. The problem with the language used 
both in Hudye QB and Hudye CA is that nothing in the CJPTA empowers a court 
to order a transfer. The CJPTA only enables the initial court, once the requisite 
preconditions are satisfied, to order a request to another court that the requested 
court accept a transfer. It takes two to tango and two to transfer a proceeding. 
If, and only if, the second court accepts the request does the transfer become 
effective, and when that request is made no further order from the initial court 
is needed. Of course, little harm will come from the initial court saying in its 
reasons that it will order a transfer. The court order, when it is issued, will almost 
certainly take the form of a request. Still, there is something to be said for the 
courts tracking the language of the statute more carefully than the reasons in 
Hudye QB and Hudye CA did.39
There is a final feature of the Hudye Farms litigation, one that arises not 
from what the courts wrote but from what happened, or did not happen, after 
37. It should be noted that a court should not grant both remedies—a stay and a transfer 
request. If it first stays the action and then initiates a transfer request that is later accepted, 
the transferee court will have inherited a stayed action.
38. Hudye CA, supra note 14 at para 19.
39. Some later Saskatchewan cases have done better. See e.g. Geissler v Geissler, 2018 SKQB 14 at 
para 56, 2018 CarswellSask 8 (WL Can), where the court decides “to request the Nova Scotia 
Supreme Court (Family Division) to accept a transfer of this proceeding… .”
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the appeal court confirmed the Court of Queen’s Bench decision. The proceeding 
was discontinued.40 What happened in the case of Hudye seems to have happened 
in other successful transfer applications, too. Looking first at the reported cases, 
there is a dearth of proceedings where one can discover both the initial decision 
initiating the transfer and the continuation of the proceedings in the accepting 
jurisdiction.41 Of course, many matters are not reported, so the law reports and 
decisions databases are not definitive on this point. However, my inquiries to 
counsel have turned up other cases where courts have consented to issue a transfer 
request but the parties then elect not to pursue the matter.42 
It is far from clear that we should be either surprised or concerned about 
the fact that few successful transfer request applications result in actual transfers 
that are then continued in another province or country. It is common for a civil 
action to be settled or abandoned after an initial court skirmish. This happens 
after successful forum non conveniens motions and one would expect the same to 
occur after a successful transfer request application. Moreover, the events that 
took place shortly after the decision in Hudye CA—the effective dismantling of 
the Wheat Board, or at least the end of its monopsonic43 status—possibly had 
something to do with the demise of the action.
Apart from the fact that judgments authorizing transfer requests may not 
result in complete transfers, it was noted above that not many transfer requests are 
brought in the first place. It is not clear we should lose sleep over that either. There 
may be many practical reasons why it is easier to reach the same result by simply 
convincing the initial court to stay or dismiss an action and requiring a plaintiff 
to start afresh elsewhere. Still, the infrequency of applications for transfers, and 
the downright rarity of successful transfers, is cause for some comment.
I suggested above that it was in part the novelty, and perhaps relative 
complexity, of the proceedings transfer provisions (Part 3) of the CJPTA that 
40. Email from James E McLandress, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of Winnipeg 
Airports Authority Inc, to Vaughan Black (13 September 2016) [unpublished, on file with 
author]; Email from Jordan Hardy, Counsel in Hudye CA, to Vaughan Black (8 October 
2016) [unpublished, on file with author]. It seems that a Manitoba court did accept the 
transfer request, but then the action went nowhere.
41. Contrast this with transfers under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, 
s 187(1), where one can read both the first decision initiating the transfer (see e.g. Andre 
Tardif Agency Ltd v Burlingham Associates Inc, 2013 ONCA 46, 225 ACWS (3d) 606) and 
the subsequent continuation of the proceeding in another province’s courts (see Andre Tardif 
Agency Ltd v Burlingham Associates Inc, 2015 SKQB 87, 253 ACWS (3d) 518).
42. See e.g. the proceedings in Wheatland, supra note 27.
43. This change in status of the Wheat Board was a result of the coming into force of the 
Marketing Freedom for Grain Farmers Act, SC 2011, c 25.
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explained their slow uptake in practice. In connection to this point, I conclude 
with one very modest suggestion for making those provisions more user-friendly: 
Those responsible for crafting civil procedure rules should do more to implement 
rules that facilitate CJPTA proceedings transfers. It was always contemplated that 
provinces adopting a CJPTA would make complementary changes to their rules 
of court to smooth and expedite its application. The ULCC’s commentary on the 
CJPTA states as much.44 However, Nova Scotia has done nothing on this score, 
either with respect to territorial competence or proceedings transfer.45 British 
Columbia’s Supreme Court Civil Rules do, in fact, have a short post-CJPTA rule 
touching on proceedings transfers. However, it deals mainly with translation of 
documents relating to a proceeding transferred from a foreign court and is very 
brief. For instance, it is far less comprehensive and detailed than BC’s court rules 
relating to transfer of a proceeding from the Provincial Court to the Supreme 
Court.46 Only Saskatchewan has made a significant effort in this regard, and it 
did so belatedly. Only in mid-2013, more than nine years after it had brought its 
CJPTA into force, did Saskatchewan add detailed sections to its Queen’s Bench 
Rules (and a corresponding form) dealing with CJPTA proceedings transfers.47 
Even those are hardly comprehensive.
By way of contrast, consider the English rules of court with respect to their 
statutory transfer provisions most analogous to those in the CJPTA. England 
has no general provision comparable to Part 3 of the CJPTA. No country does.48 
But England does have a provision of limited applicability that is in many 
respects similar to Part 3, and which relates to child custody proceedings. There, 
cross-border transfers of court proceedings are permitted if a transfer is in the best 
interests of the child. These are permitted under both article 15 of the Brussels 
44. See CJPTA, supra note 1, comment 5.1.
45. There are provisions in the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules dealing with transferring 
proceedings from one judicial district to another within Nova Scotia (r 59.03(2)), 
transferring from the Family Division of the Supreme Court to the Family Court (r 
60A.04(4)), and transferring motions to be heard outside a court room to a court room 
(r 22.16), but none dealing with cross-border transfers pursuant to the CJPTA. See 
Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules (official consolidation 6 June 2008 as 
amended 23 June 2017), online: <www.courts.ns.ca/Civil_Procedure_Rules/documents/
cpr_consolidated_rules_17_06.pdf>.
46. See British Columbia, Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009, r 19-1, 19-4, 
as amended by BC Reg 3/2016. Rule 19-1 governs transfer of proceedings from Provincial 
Court, and rule 19-4 governs transfer of proceedings from foreign courts. 
47. See Saskatchewan, Queen’s Bench Rules, r 13-61-13-64; ibid, forms 13-63A, 13-63B.
48. For a brief account of proceedings transfer provisions in other countries see Black, Pitel & 
Sobkin, supra note 10 at 218-21, 247-49.
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II-bis Regulation49 and articles 8 and 9 of the Hague Child Protection Convention 
of 1996,50 both currently in effect in England and Wales.51 The details of these 
two quite similar provisions are not pertinent here. It suffices to note that, at least 
in general conception, they are similar to Part 3 of the CJPTA in that they give 
an initial court the discretion to initiate a transfer of proceedings to the courts 
of another country, either at the request of a party or on its own initiative. The 
transfer may then take place if the request is made and the requested court agrees. 
As noted above, however, these provisions apply only in child custody matters 
and the discretion is to be exercised only where it serves the best interests of the 
child (not, for instance, efficient deployment of judicial resources).
There are two things to note for present purposes. The first is that England’s 
Family Procedure Rules offer lengthy guidelines on how to go about the 
international transfer of a proceeding.52 They deal with how and to whom 
notice must be given, what must be filed, how quickly a court must act once 
an application has been received, how a potential transferee court should be 
contacted, how soon a receiving court must fix a hearing to deal with the future 
conduct of the case, and a variety of other matters. The second thing to note is 
that, in contrast to the situation under Part 3 of the CJPTA, in England there 
has been a lot of judicial activity under these provisions, including some by 
appellate courts.53 
Of course, there is no warrant for drawing a causal connection between 
England’s relatively detailed court rules (compared with the rules of the CJPTA 
provinces, that is) and its ample case law. For reasons that will quite possibly 
49. EC, Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, [2003] OJ, L 338/1 at 15 (commonly referred to as Brussels II-bis).
50. Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in 
Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, 19 October 1996, 
HCCH Convention No 25 (entered into force 1 January 2002) (commonly referred to as the 
Hague Child Protection Convention 1996). Canada is not a party.
51. Of course it remains to be seen how Brexit will affect the applicability of the former in 
England and Wales.
52. The Family Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955, r 12.61-12.67, online: <www.legislation.gov.
uk/uksi/2010/2955/part/12/made>. One interesting respect in which these rules differ from 
the CJPTA is that they also allow the courts of a potential transferee country to request the 
first-seized court to offer a transfer. That is, a party who craves a transfer can go to the court 
of the country to which he or she hopes a transfer can be made and request that court to 
contact the court initially seized and ask that court to offer to transfer the proceedings to it. 
See ibid, r 12.62(1)(b).
53. For a discussion of these cases, see Ian Curry-Sumner & Maria Wright, “Article 15 Brussels 
II-bis: Two Views from Different Sides of the Channel” (2015) 17:2 Eur J L Reform 352.
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remain forever unclear and open to speculation, the ULCC was just wrong in 
thinking that there would ever be much practical use or appetite for a general 
cross-border proceedings transfer arrangement. If that is the case, then even the 
promulgation of detailed court rules will not create a situation where it is common 
to see a legal action started in one province and concluded in another. Courts and 
scholars will continue to be justified in referring to the CJPTA simply as a statute 
that clarifies and systematizes the territorial jurisdiction of the superior courts.
